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1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266–67 (2009); Stephen Breyer,
Serving America’s Best Interests, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 139, 139; Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
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invoked public-confidence arguments to support their opposing positions in
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., which held that a state supreme court justice who received campaign
contributions from a party should have recused himself from the case.2
Although courts frequently invoke such arguments, they rarely, if ever, define
“public” or explain how a particular decision will foster or harm public
confidence.3 If courts conceive of the “public” as the general public, then
serious questions arise regarding the courts’ ability to send messages to this
audience, as most members of the general public do not read judicial opinions,
have little or no direct experience with the court system, and receive legal
news from incomplete or inaccurate media reports about highly salient cases.4
Further, regardless of how courts define the public, that group is undoubtedly
divided into many social and political factions; therefore, controversial court
decisions that breed trust in some of these factions seem just as likely to breed
distrust in others.5 Thus, it seems questionable to maintain that a judicial
opinion can foster broad public confidence in the courts.
This Article offers a framework that accounts for these problems and gives
greater practical meaning to judicial rhetoric about fostering public confidence
in the legal system. It suggests that although courts may have difficulty
affecting general public opinion on a large scale, courts can foster the
confidence of people who directly participate in the judicial system by creating
and following basic rules of procedural fairness. The Article then argues that
Caperton, although unlikely to broadly affect the general public’s confidence
in the courts, will improve the confidence of people who directly experience
the court system by improving fundamental procedural fairness.
Turning to jury selection, a context in which members of the general public
directly experience the court system, this Article discusses how the legal
system should respond when a potential juror has a close
relationship—familial or nonfamilial—to the presiding judge.6 Although
ON THE NATIONAL SURVEY: HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL
SURVEY 12 (1999), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC

_PublicViewCrtsPub.pdf (discussing the public’s confidence in public institutes compared to
confidence in courts).
2. 129 S. Ct. at 2266–67.
3. See infra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
4. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 178 (2004). Professors Paul Robinson and John
Darley have raised similar concerns when discussing deterrence rationales for criminal laws. Id.
at 175–76. They argue that traditional deterrence justifications fail to acknowledge that potential
offenders lack accurate knowledge of specific legal rules, thus creating a “Legal Knowledge
Hurdle” Id.
5. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 1824–25 (discussing court decisions on abortion rights).
6. See, e.g., State v. Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 739 (2009) (discussing a judge’s refusal to
strike his mother as a juror); State v. Sellhausen, 330 Wis. 2d 778, 794 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(involving an appeal protesting the presence of the judge’s daughter-in-law on the jury panel).
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judges and lawyers may not view this as problematic at first blush, and
although legal rules do not specifically prohibit this situation,7 courts should
consider how an average citizen may perceive a close relationship between a
judge and a juror as a threat to procedural fairness. This Article proposes a
categorical rule excluding jurors who have at least a third degree of kinship to
the judge. For other relationships (more distant familial relationships or close
nonfamilial relationships), this Article suggests that courts utilize voir dire
concerning the relationship, require full disclosure by the parties, and employ a
balancing test that errs on the side of exclusion.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE NEED TO PROTECT PUBLIC
CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS
Underlying the Caperton discussion about whether a judge should be able to
preside over a case involving a significant campaign contributor,8 a deeper
question emerged: how to protect public confidence in the courts.9 At oral
argument, counsel for Massey argued that the mere appearance of judicial bias
does not violate due process, to which Justice Anthony Kennedy replied: “But
our whole system is designed to ensure confidence in our judgments.”10
Justice Kennedy reiterated this sentiment in the majority opinion, quoting a
previous discussion that stated, “The power and the prerogative of a
court . . . rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The
citizen’s respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s
absolute probity.”11 Thus, a major theme underlying the Caperton majority
opinion is that the public will lose confidence in the courts if judges preside
over cases involving their own significant campaign contributors. The
dissenting Justices acknowledged the importance of protecting public

7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266–67 (2009) (discussing a
contribution by Don Blankenship, Massey Coal’s Chairman and CEO, to judicial candidate Brent
Benjamin as the company was preparing to appeal an adverse $50 million jury verdict).
Victorious in the 2004 election, Judge Benjamin twice denied Capterton’s recusal motions and
reversed the verdict against Massey Coal. Id. at 2257–58.
9. Id. at 2266–67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
10. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–37, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
11. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2266–67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 793
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,
864 (1988) (“[I]n determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of [a judicial
recusal statute,] it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular
case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of
undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind
that ‘to perform its high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955))).
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confidence in the courts,12 but argued that the majority opinion would foster
doubts, not confidence, by encouraging frivolous allegations of judicial bias.13
Neither the majority nor the dissent defines “public” or explains how public
confidence can be fostered through rules governing judicial recusal.14 In that
respect, Caperton is no different than the cases leading up to it. The Supreme
Court has frequently used these undefined concepts when explaining that its
role is to protect not only justice in fact, but also the appearance of justice by
protecting public confidence in the legal system.15
For example, the Court has held that appointing a special prosecutor with a
conflict of interest violates due process—a violation not insulated by
harmless-error analysis because of the need to protect public confidence.16
The Court’s judicial-recusal opinions reflect this notion as well, holding that
the appearance of bias, rather than actual bias, is the determining factor in such
cases.17 In the context of a judge’s financial interest, the Court has held that the
12. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 2266–67 (majority opinion); id. at 2268–69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811 (1987);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536
(1925).
16. Young, 481 U.S. at 814. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the trial
court entered a civil injunction preventing the defendants from infringing the plaintiff’s patent.
Id. When the plaintiffs began to suspect that the patent infringement was continuing despite the
injunction, the plaintiff’s attorneys convinced the trial court to appoint them as special
prosecutors in the subsequent contempt proceedings. Id. at 791–92. The defendants were
eventually convicted of contempt. Id. at 792. The Supreme Court, however, exercised its
superintending authority and reversed the contempt convictions because of the special
prosecutors’ conflict of interest. Id. at 814. In concluding that harmless-error analysis could not
apply, the Court emphasized the need to protect public confidence in the courts:
[A]ppointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety that
diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general. The narrow
focus of harmless-error analysis is not sensitive to this underlying concern . . . . A
concern for actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is at stake
is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system. “[J]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice,” and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents
the appearance of precisely the opposite. Society’s interest in disinterested prosecution
therefore would not be adequately protected by harmless-error analysis, for such
analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental nature of the error committed.
Id. at 811–12 (citation omitted) (quoting Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14).
17. See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864–65 (1988); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). It was not always clear in the early cases that the mere
appearance of impropriety was a significant constitutional consideration in cases concerning
judicial conduct. The right to an impartial judge is not an explicit constitutional right, but is
implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
523 (1927). The Court has recognized the common law rule that a judge may not preside over a
case in which he or she has “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest.” Id. at 523. The
Court also explained that the Framers intended for “‘[n]o man . . . to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity.’” Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55–56 (James
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mayor of a municipality cannot preside over criminal cases if the
municipality’s treasury would benefit financially from convicting the
defendants.18 In a similar, though less direct, example involving a judge’s
financial interest, the Court held that a state supreme court judge could not
preside over a lawsuit that closely resembled a prior lawsuit brought by the
judge.19 Outside the context of a judge’s financial interest, the Court has also
held that a judge may not sit as both the “one-man grand jury” that charges a
person with a crime and the presiding judge in the same person’s trial.20
In these cases, the Court emphasized that reversal does not rely on whether
justice has been served in the ultimate outcome of the case;21 rather, even if
justice likely was served, reversal may be required because the circumstances
did not satisfy the appearance of justice and therefore harmed public
confidence.22 These cases culminated in Caperton, which applied the previous
Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894)). However, this did not clarify whether the appearance of
impropriety alone could create a due-process violation. In fact, most questions involving judicial
disqualification were historically for the legislature to decide and “did not rise to a constitutional
level.” FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948) (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).
Moreover, the traditional common law rule did not permit “disqualification for bias or prejudice”
because “‘the law [does] not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already
sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption
and idea.’” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *361).
18. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. In Tumey v. Ohio, the mayor of a village presided as judge
over cases in which citizens were accused of illegally possessing alcohol. Id. at 516. The
mayor’s salary was supplemented for convicting people of these alcohol offenses, and the
proceeds from fines resulting from such convictions were placed into a treasury fund for the
village. Id. at 516–17, 519. The Court concluded that these financial incentives resulted in a
due-process violation because the mayor had both a direct and an indirect incentive to convict
people. Id. at 532–33. In a similar case years later, the Court found a due-process violation even
though the mayor did not directly benefit. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1972).
19. See Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 823. In this case, a state supreme court justice’s lawsuit
claiming that an insurance company had refused to compensate an insured in bad faith. Id. The
justice then presided over a very similar lawsuit in the state supreme court and voted against the
insurance company. Id. at 818. The Supreme Court held that this violated due process because
the justice’s vote in the state supreme court aided his own financial interests in his lawsuit. Id. at
825.
20. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259–62 (holding that the campaign contributions required
recusal and invoking the need to protect both the appearance of justice and the public confidence
in the courts).
22. See, e.g., Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 (“We make clear that we are not required to decide
whether in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but only whether sitting on the case then before the
Supreme Court of Alabama ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge
to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’” (quoting Ward, 409 U.S. at 60));
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (“Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have
no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.’” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954))); Tumey, 273
U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (“There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a consideration as
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recusal standards to the factual context of judicial campaign contributions.23
Although the Court has repeatedly raised concern for protecting public
confidence, the Court has never offered a detailed analysis of who “the public”
is and how judicial decisions protect the public’s confidence. Indeed, without
such explanation, any case that relies on a public-confidence argument is
vulnerable to attack based on Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent in Caperton,
which argued that public confidence is harmed, not helped, by Supreme Court
decisions affirming claims of potential partiality or bias, because such
decisions will encourage additional (possibly frivolous) claims.24 To evaluate
that point, courts need a better framework for analyzing public-confidence
arguments. Scholarly commentary on Caperton, however, has yet to provide
such a framework.25
$12 costs in each case to affect their judgment in it; but the requirement of due process of law in
judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.”). The Court in Caperton
acknowledged that the justice had subjectively inquired into the possibility of his own bias and
had found none, and refused to question this finding. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262–63. The
Court expressly stated that it would not attempt to “determine whether there was actual bias.” Id.
(noting that the Court would not attempt to “determine whether there was actual bias”).
23. 129 S. Ct. at 2265. Although Justice Kennedy’s opinion relied on principles similar to
those underlying past decisions, it contained a subtle linguistic distinction from the previous
recusal cases and from most state judicial-recusal codes. State codes generally require recusal
when there is an appearance of bias—when a judge’s “‘impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.’” See id. at 2266 (quoting W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)
(2011)). However, Justice Kennedy declined to hold that violating this standard constituted a
due-process violation and noted that “most disputes over disqualification will be resolved without
resort to the Constitution.” Id. at 2267. Justice Kennedy noted that the due-process violations
required a “probability of actual bias” or “serious risk of actual bias,” rather than the mere
appearance of bias. Id. at 2263, 2265.
24. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
25. Instead, scholars have focused largely on Caperton’s relation to judicial elections by
debating whether and to what extent Caperton attacks judicial elections, if such an attack is
beneficial or detrimental, and what its likely effect will be. See Bert Brandenburg, Inevitable,
Flexible, Expandable Caperton?, 33 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 617, 624 (2010) (positing that
Caperton was an inevitable response to large donors in judicial elections); Eric Sandberg-Zakian,
Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and the Due Process Clause After Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV. 179, 181, 203 (2011) (criticizing Caperton for attacking
judicial elections and noting that bias “is an element of judicial elections that is intended,
constitutive, and, in some views, normatively desireable”). Other commentators have debated
whether Caperton represented an extreme situation; some agree that the justice’s
non-recusal was outrageous, whereas others maintain that the Court’s decision relied on an
inaccurate version of the actual facts. Compare Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and
Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal,
29 REV. LITIG. 249, 268 (2010) (“Justice Benjamin’s recusal was clearly required. The average
judge presiding over a very important ($50 million) case to a very substantial benefactor ($3
million) would of course be tempted to be biased in favor of the benefactor and prejudiced against
his litigation opponent.”), with James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, Extreme Facts,
Extraordinary Case: The Sui Generis Recusal Test of Caperton v. Massey, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV.
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS
Although courts fail to define what target audience constitutes the “public,”
or how the messages in judicial opinions will reach the public, they appear to
refer to a broad, nationwide conception of the general public.26 This
conception is problematic because it relies on the highly questionable
assumption that knowledge of judicial opinions is widespread.
Survey researchers debate how much basic knowledge the general public has
about the court system,27 but even the most optimistic estimates do not suggest
that the general public has knowledge of judicial decisions—even those from
the Supreme Court.28 Rather, researchers assume that the general public lacks
knowledge of all but the few most salient Supreme Court decisions.29
Therefore, courts cannot pretend to influence broad public opinion through
average judicial opinions because the messages will not reach the intended
recipients. Professors Robinson and Darley raised similar points when
analyzing the deterrent effect of criminal laws.30 Robinson and Darley argue
that the target audience for a deterrent effect must acquire accurate knowledge
of what the law requires for criminal laws to deter crime.31 They analyze
305, 312–13 (2010) (noting that the Court’s “test was designed to fit the facts exactly”). Other
commentary discusses the Court’s “probability of bias” standard, and the extent to which it differs
from the traditional state-law recusal standard based on the “appearance of bias.” See Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances: What Caperton v. Massey Should Have
Said, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 529, 539–45 (2010); see also Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton:
Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 75 (2010)
(“[P]robability of bias is not the same as appearance of bias, although many commentators—and
even Justice Ginsburg—conflate the two. But the difference is crucial: an appearance-based
standard focuses on the public’s perception of the fairness of the court, while a probability-based
standard centers on a reasonable judge’s likelihood of actual bias. The subject of the former
inquiry is a member of the public; the subject of the latter inquiry is the judge in question. These
are two very different tests, and the relevant factors in determining whether the test is met may be
wildly different.”).
26. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 811–12
(1987); Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 175–76; supra notes
16–17.
27. Compare JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS 34 (2009) (arguing that survey data shows the general public’s “relatively high
levels” of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions), with HERBERT M. KRITZER, INTO THE
ELECTORAL WATERS: THE IMPACT OF BUSH V. GORE ON PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2–3 (2002), available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/
kritzer/research/opinion/BvG_Impact.pdf (indicating that research supports that Americans tend
to “know[] little about the Court or its workings”).
28. See, e.g., GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 27, at 27–29 (declining to conclude that
Americans “have a great deal of substantive knowledge” of the Court’s rulings).
29. See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 27, at 6 (“Typically, courts are thought to be
relatively low salience institutions . . . .”); VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 6 (2003) (“Most cases simply do not appear to resonate on the
national agenda.”).
30. Robinson & Darley, supra note 4, at 175.
31. Id.
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behavioral-science data in various contexts to conclude that people do not have
sufficiently accurate knowledge of specific criminal laws to facilitate such a
deterrent effect.32 The same knowledge requisite is necessary to foster public
confidence through judicial opinions because, if the general public does not
know about a judicial decision, then the opinion cannot foster public
confidence in the court system. To be sure, some highly salient court decisions
on controversial subjects are widely known, and even less salient decisions are
known by some segments of the population.33 But even then, mere knowledge
of a judicial decision does not always cultivate confidence.34
A second problem with trying to foster broad-based public confidence
through judicial decisions is the difficulty of identifying what triggers
confidence in the courts.35 One might relate “confidence” to agreement with
court decisions, based on the commonsense notion that people have confidence
in courts if they like the outcomes courts reach. But this approach yields
problems; most high-profile decisions involve highly controversial social or
political issues and thus will displease a significant percentage of the
population.36 Indeed, as courts perform one of their proper roles as sometimes
counter-majoritarian institutions, they will make decisions that are unpopular
with a majority of the general public.37 Therefore, it makes little sense to
assess public confidence in the courts by assessing whether courts are reaching
popular outcomes.
The problem stretches beyond the courts’ resolution of controversial issues.
As Professor Richard Fallon has noted, it is difficult to ascertain whether a
collective notion of public confidence in the courts exists when even close
court observers do not collectively agree on the proper extent and use of
courts’ power.38 Members of the academic community broadly disagree about
core aspects of the courts’ role and how courts should carry out such
obligations.39 To name only one example, strong disagreement arises
regarding the proper methodology for constitutional interpretation, specifically
32. Id. at 176.
33. See HOEKSTRA, supra note 29, at 6, 9.
34. See id. at 10–11 (noting that individuals are only inclined to think about court decisions
regarding areas of personal importance).
35. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting
public perception—a job not for lawyers but for political campaign managers—the Justices
should do what is legally right.”); see also GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 27, at 5 (“When it
comes to the question of how legitimacy is created, maintained, and destroyed, social scientists
have some theories and conjectures, but precious little data, and scant understanding of
processes of opinion updating and change.” (emphasis in original)).
36. See Fallon, supra note 1, 1824–25 (discussing public reaction to Roe v. Wade based on
anti-abortion sentiments rather than due-process issues).
37. See id. at 1825.
38. Id. at 1826–27.
39. Id. at 1826.
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whether courts should interpret the Constitution in light of original intent or as
a living document that changes along with social values.40 When court
decisions touch on such controversial issues, it will be difficult for such
decisions to foster broad public confidence.
Overall, then, there are good reasons to doubt whether courts, through
judicial opinions, can broadly affect the general public’s confidence in the
legal system. From that perspective, the public-confidence arguments used by
both the majority and the dissent in Caperton appear hollow. The general
public probably does not know about the Caperton decision or understand the
majority’s opinion, which undermines the Court’s rhetoric about fostering
public confidence. Even if Caperton is one of the rare highly salient opinions
that the national media widely reported to the general public, such media
coverage may be inaccurate or may fail to communicate the Court’s intended
message in a way that builds public confidence. Likewise, the dissent’s
assertion that the decision will reduce public confidence by leading to an
increase in unfair recusal motions seems problematic, as it is unlikely that the
general public will ever know about this development.41 Even a very large
increase in recusal motions probably would not attract significant media
attention, especially not the kind of attention that an average person in the
general public would notice.42
But a different conception of public confidence leads to different
conclusions. Instead of focusing on the “general public,” courts should target
those directly involved in or observing specific cases,43 and instead of focusing
on the outcomes of cases involving controversial social issues, courts should
focus on basic procedural fairness.44

40. Id. at 1810–11.
41. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Gregory A. Galdeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public
Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209, 1211 (1986); Jeffery J. Mondak,
The Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1121–22 (1997).
43. See Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of
Psychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 663 (2007)
(“[P]eople’s reactions to their dealings with legal authorities are most strongly shaped by whether
they think they have received a fair ‘day in court.’”).
44. The concept of procedural fairness incorporates two related ideas: the “experience that
court users have with the court system, whether as litigants, jurors, witnesses, or affected parties,”
and people’s perceptions of the manner in which public officials use their authority. CTR. FOR
COURT INNOVATION, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN CALIFORNIA: INITIATIVES, CHALLENGES, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011); Tyler, supra note 43, at 663. Survey researchers have extensively
sudied how procedural fairness affects public confidence in the legal system. See generally, e.g.,
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH
THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Jonathan D. Casper, Tom R. Tyler & Bonnie Fisher,
Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & SOC. REV. 483 (1988); Raymond Paternoster et al.,
Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 L. & SOC.
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Reviewing data from survey participants who had personal interactions with
the court system, Professor Tom Tyler identified four elements of procedural
fairness that affect people’s confidence in the courts: 1) “an opportunity to
state their case to legal authorities”; 2) the outward neutrality of the
decision maker; 3) the dignity, respect, and politeness with which they are
treated; and 4) the impression that the authorities are “benevolent and caring,”
and trying to act in the public interest.45 The concern for procedural fairness
cuts across race, ethnicity, and economic status.46
Furthermore, the surveys revealed that people care more about procedural
fairness than they do about ultimate outcomes, and that issues of procedural
fairness related centrally to the reactions of the losing parties.47 Therefore, a
losing party who believes court procedures were fair is much more likely to
accept the outcome of the case.48
The empirical research also examined whether public confidence in the
courts is declining and how it can be improved.49 Tyler concluded that some
survey data makes it “tempting” to conclude that public confidence in the
courts is declining, but that ultimately there is insufficient evidence to support
that general conclusion.50 However, he does acknowledge that public
confidence in all courts, particularly the Supreme Court, is low, and has been
low for several decades.51
Tyler uses this data to argue that public confidence in the courts can be
improved by “designing court procedures that lead the people who personally
deal with the courts to have positive experiences.”52 Such efforts can focus not
only on the litigants in specific cases, but on other members of the public who
participate in the court system, such as witnesses, jurors, and litigants’ family
members. Tyler recommends that “[c]ourts should emphasize their position as
neutral authorities whose role is to interpret and apply the law. The belief that
courts make decisions based upon the neutral application of principles to the
facts of particular cases is central to the legitimacy of courts.”53
Such a framework proves useful in analyzing public-confidence arguments
like those in Caperton. Under this framework, the majority opinion seems
REV. 163 (1997); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 513 (2003).
45. Tyler, supra note 43, at 664.
46. Id. at 665.
47. Id. at 664; accord CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, supra note 44, at 1.
48. Tyler, supra note 43, at 664.
49. Id. at 690–91.
50. Id. at 690.
51. Id. at 691. Other scholars appear to disagree with this conclusion to some extent. See,
e.g., GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 27, at 47–49 (arguing that the decline in confidence
resulted from an unusually high period of court favorability and that “the court seems as widely
trusted today as it was a decage ago”).
52. Tyler, supra note 43, at 692.
53. Id. at 694.
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likely to foster the confidence of people participating in the court system.54
People will be impressed with the impartiality and integrity of a judge who
recused herself because a party had been a significant campaign supporter,
whereas the refusal to recuse in such circumstances runs a great risk of
fostering the view that the courts are vulnerable to improper influence.55 This
is the kind of core aspect of procedural fairness that relates centrally to
people’s confidence in the courts.
When “public” refers to participants in a particular case, and courts seek to
uphold procedural fairness, the dissent’s argument in Caperton—that an influx
of recusal motions will weaken public confidence56—seems less convincing. It
seems implausible that the participants in a case would lose much confidence
in the court due to mere recusal motions, and that minimal impact would pale
in comparison to the significant impact a judge could have by choosing to
recuse him- or herself under circumstances like those in Caperton. Viewing
the concept of public confidence in this manner, the majority in Caperton
appears to have the better argument.
Thus, in writing opinions and conducting cases before them, courts can
influence public confidence through fair procedures that will resonate with
people who directly participate in court proceedings.57 If applied widely
54. See Jonathan H. Todt, Note, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.: The Objective Standard
for Judicial Recusal, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 467 (2011) (arguing that the Caperton
majority’s approach will improve public confidence in the courts and noting the Court’s fairness
in opinions).
55. Cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 928 (2004) (Scalia, J., denying
motion to recuse) (“The people must have confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and that
cannot exist in a system that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship for
favor . . . .”).
56. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267–68 (2009).
57. Realistically, fostering public confidence through individual litigants is an uphill battle,
because the system’s institutional structure is, in many respects, inherently alienating. Access to
the legal system often relies on the ability of individuals to hire a lawyer; indeed, the rules and
procedures governing the system assume that litigants will have legal representation. Russell
Engler, And Justice For All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1988 (1999). But in reality,
self-representation is now the norm in many kinds of cases. Id. at 1987–88. Pro se litigants face
extraordinary barriers to successfully pursuing their claims, including: legal rules that are difficult
to understand and navigate, court personnel who are prohibited from providing legal advice, and
busy judges have minimal time to explain proceedings to pro se litigants. See id. at 1988–89.
Even litigants who are able to afford a private lawyer or who receive state-appointed
representation may find the legal system inaccessible and alienating, as a lawyer prepares written
pleadings typically with minimal client assistance and often speaks in court while the client
remains silent. Furthermore, attorneys communicate with opposing counsel and court personnel
on the client’s behalf. Moreover, lawyers and judges often have professional friendships and use
a common jargon-laden language that those outside the profession may not understand.
Racial and ethnic minorities in particular enter the system with a preexisting—and not
necessarily unjustified—sense of distrust and injustice. BENNACK, supra note 1, at 30 (showing
that 33.5 percent of non-Hispanic whites, 28.6 percent of Hispanics, and 17.7 percent of African
Americans “strongly agree” that “[j]udges are generally honest and fair in deciding cases”).
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throughout the legal process, such procedures may have a substantial,
broad-based impact on public confidence.
III. WHAT TO DO WHEN THE PRESIDING JUDGE HAS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
WITH A JUROR
Every day in courts around the country, people with close relationships to
the presiding judge in a case report for jury duty. Although no empirical data
exists examining how frequently this occurs, commonsense suggests that it
happens with some frequency, especially in smaller communities with fewer
judges and limited jury pools.
Despite this inevitable occurrence,
constitutional texts, statutes, and ethical rules provide little guidance as to how
this situation should be addressed.
A. Constitutional Provisions on Qualifications for Jurors and Judges
Juror qualifications are governed by the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth
Amendment, which states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”58 A similar, though
not identical, provision in the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in
certain civil cases.59
These provisions do not regulate relationships between jurors and judges.
The Sixth Amendment states only that the jurors must be “impartial,” but does
not specify whether impartiality should be measured by objective factors, such
as whether the juror is related to another participant in the case, or by more
subjective factors revealed during voir dire, such as the juror’s subjective
views about various matters related to the case and the legal system.60 The
Seventh Amendment does not use the term “impartial,” and thus provides even
less guidance on what factors should be considered in determining whether a

Nearly seventy percent of African Americans in the study believed that courts treated African
Americans worse than whites and Hispanics, and forty percent of whites and Hispanics agreed.
Id. at 38; see HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 153–55 (1997); RONALD WEITZER & STEPHEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING
IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 5 (2006); Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste
for Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs,
1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 151 (2004); Terry Carter, Divided Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 42, 43
(discussing a survey of African American lawyers that concludes similarly).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. Id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”). Unlike the Sixth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment has not been
incorporated against the states. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,
219 (1916).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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juror is qualified.61 Thus, the jury-trial guarantees of the Constitution do not
specify any juror qualifications addressing a juror’s relationship to the judge.
The constitutional provisions for judicial qualifications are even less
specific. Unlike the right to trial by jury, the right to an impartial judge is not
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and has instead been read into the
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process by the Supreme Court.62 This
due-process provision does not specifically enumerate the qualifications
required of judges.63
Thus, although there is a constitutional right to an impartial jury64 and a
constitutional right to an impartial judge,65 the Constitution does not
specifically speak to whether a juror and the judge may have a close personal
relationship.
B. Statutory and Ethical Rules on Qualifications for Jurors and Judges
Legislatures in every state have passed laws delineating qualifications for
jurors and judges.66 However, these laws mainly regulate jurors’ and judges’
relationships to the parties or the issues in a case, not the relationship between
the judge and juror.67
As to juror qualifications, legislatures around the country have created
statutes and rules specifying when a juror should be disqualified based on his
or her relationship to a participant in a given case.68 These statutes and rules
focus on the relationship of the juror to the parties, and his connection to or
interest in the case.69 Thus, most state legislatures have enacted statutes or
court rules excluding jurors who are related by blood or marriage to a party,
attorney, or witness in the case.70 Such statutes often also allow exclusion of a
61. See id. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment does, however, contain language that
mostly insulates jury verdicts from reexamination. See supra note 59.
62. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (citing Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”).
64. See id. amend. VI.
65. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).
66. See infra notes 70–73.
67. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.431(c)(1).
68. William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1391, 1409–11 (2001).
69. Id. at 1410 (“[L]itigants may challenge jurors who are related not just to the defendant
but also to the lawyers, are in an employee/employer relationship with the defendant, are in a
landlord/tenant relationship with the defendant, are in a debtor/creditor relationship with the
defendant, are in any fiduciary relationship with the defendant, were witnesses to any of the
alleged events, or were jurors in any previous trial regarding the same allegations.” (footnotes
omitted)).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 12-16-150(4) (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-211(3) (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102(b)(1) (1999 & Supp. 2011); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 229(a) (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(b) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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juror who has a financial interest in the outcome of the case.71 No state
explicitly allows disqualification based on a juror’s relationship to the judge,
although a few states have enacted laws that could potentially exclude a related
juror.72
Similarly, statutes requiring judicial recusal focus primarily on the judge’s
impartiality to the parties and the dispute at issue.73 Although no state law
explicitly provides that a judge’s relationship with a juror is grounds for
disqualification, most states permit judicial disqualification if the judge is
related to any party or attorney in the case or has a financial interest in the
outcome.74 Codes of judicial conduct in all but two states (Louisiana and
§ 913.03(9) (West 2001); GA. CODE. ANN. § 15-12-163(b)(4) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-2020(1) (2004); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1765(3) (2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 797(3) (1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1301 (2003); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 494.470(1) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-7-223(2), 46-16-115(2)(a) (2011); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.050(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212(5) (2009);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06(2) (2006); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(c) (McKinney
2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42(G) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 572
(West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 660(1) (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 136.220(1) (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-10-14 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 15-14-6.1(2)–(3) (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-12 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 805.08(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-11-203(a)(ii), 7-11-105(a)(iv)
(2011); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 47(c)(9); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(9); COLO. R. CIV. P. 47(e)(2);
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1)(II); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.431(c)(1); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 47(h)(2); IND. JURY
R. 17(a)(6); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.915(6)(d); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.18(5)(d); MASS. R. CIV. P.
47(a)(1); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(b)(1); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.02(5)(1)(5); OHIO R. CRIM. P.
24(C)(10); OR. R. CIV. P. 57(D)(1)(c); UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(f)(2); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18(e)(3); VA.
SUP. CT. R. 3A:14(a)(1).
71. ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(12); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102(b)(4); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-14-06(3), (5); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4110(a) (McKinney 2007); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 47(c)(13);
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(12); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229(b), (d); COLO. R. CIV. P. 47(e)(3),
(5); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 47(h)(5); OR. R. CIV. P. 57(D)(1)(d), (f); UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(f)(5).
72. See, e.g., KY. CT. R. 9.36(1) (“When there is reasonable ground to believe that a
prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, that juror shall be
excused as not qualified.”).
73. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1223(b) (2009) (requiring judge recusal for prejudice
or familial relations to the defendant); ARIZ R. CRIM. P. 10(a) (“[A]ny defendant shall be entitled
to a change of judge if a fair and impartial hearing or trial cannot be had by reason of the interest
or prejudice of the assigned judge.”).
74. See ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; ALA. CODE. § 12-1-12;
ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-6-201 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 51-39 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 38.02 (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 601-7 (LexisNexis 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-25-3-2 (LexisNexis 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-311 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26A.015(2) (LexisNexis 1998); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 544.290 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-803 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-739
(LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1223; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.031
(LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1401-02 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.210 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-130 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-12-37
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-222 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 61 (2002);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.23 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.20.175 (West Supp. 2011);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-8 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 757.19 (West 2011); CAL.
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Texas) direct a judge to recuse herself if the judge or the judge’s relative is
related to a party, attorney, or person likely to be a material witness.75
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
3(E), provides:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where:
....
(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a
fiduciary, or the judge’s spouse, parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge’s family
residing in the judge’s household, has an economic interest
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest
that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse
of such a person:
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170.1, 170.6 (West 2006); COLO. R. CIV. P. 97; IDAHO R. CIV. P. 40(d)(2);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151; LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 671; MICH. CT. R. 2.003;
MINN. R. CIV. P. 63.02; N.H. SUP. CT. R. 2.11; N.J. CT. R. 1:12-1; N.Y. JUD. LAW § 14
(McKinney 2002); PA. R. CT. 8 (2011).
75. See, e.g., ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2011); ARIZ. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2009); CAL.
CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(E) (2005); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11
(2011); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(E) (2011); GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2011); HAW. REV. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a)(2) (2011); ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2009);
IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 51:2.11
(2010); KAN. R. JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(C) (2006) (providing only general terms for recusal); ME. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(E) (2004); MD. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); MASS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2011); MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(C) (2011); MINN.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); MISS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)
(2011); MO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.03, Canon 3(E) (2011); MONT. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 2.12 (2011); NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); N.H. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2012); N.M.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 21-400 (2011); N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 100.3(c)
(2011); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (2011); N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1998–99); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2009); OKLA.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2-106 (2011);
PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3(C) (2011); R.I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(E) (2011); S.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2011); S.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2006); TENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (2011); UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011); VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)
(2009); CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF VA. Canon 3(E) (2011);
WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D) (2011); W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(E) (2011); WYO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2010).
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(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have more than a
de minimis interest that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding . . . .76
Some states have used this model code to form judicial disqualification
rules; for instance, the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct directs a judge to recuse
himself if the judge is related to another judge who has presided over the same
case.77 The Ohio Code specifically provides for recusal when “[t]he judge
knows that the judge’s spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of
such a person has acted as a judge in the proceeding.”78 Despite such
regulations on relationships with other judges, case issues, or financial
interests, neither the statutes nor rules governing juror and judicial
qualifications answer whether a judge and juror may have a close relationship
to each other.
C. Cases Addressing Related Jurors and Judges
In addition to the lack of textual guidance from constitutional provisions,
statutes, or ethical rules, very little case law addresses judges who have a close
relationship with a juror.79 Instead, the vast majority of cases addressing
qualifications of jurors focus mainly on ensuring that jurors have no bias
toward or relationship with any of the parties, lawyers, or witnesses.80 The
cases have largely ignored jurors’ relationships to the judge.81

76. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1999).
77. OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(6) (2009).
78. Id.
79. See infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text.
80. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220–21 (1982) (finding no due-process violation
when a juror previously applied for a job at the prosecutor’s office); United States v. Barone, 114
F.3d 1284, 1305–07 (1st Cir. 1997) (affiriming the lower court’s dismissal of a juror after
deliberations had started due to impracticality); United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461, 464–66
(6th Cir. 1988) (affirming juror’s removal because juror’s wife was seen talking to the defendant
and hugging the defendant’s wife); State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036, 1040–41 (Haw. 1997) (finding
that failure to excuse a juror who worked as a prosecutor in the same office as the prosecution
resulted in the defendant’s use of his last premeptory challenge); Taylor v. State, 656 So.2d 104,
111 (Miss. 1995) (explaining that a for-cause juror challenge was improperly overruled because
the juror’s sibling was an assistant state’s attorney); State v. Sanchez, 901 P.2d 178, 183–84
(N.M. 1995) (noting that a juror’s tenuous relationship with prosecutors was insufficient to
disqualify her).
81. See supra note 80.
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Only three appellate courts—two state supreme courts and one state court of
appeals—have addressed the issue.82 All three held that the juror who had a
close relationship to the judge served in error, and reversed the judgment
without providing a detailed constitutional analysis.83 In State v. Tody, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the judge erred by allowing his
mother to serve on the jury; however, the six-justice panel disagreed as to the
rationale and produced two split opinions.84 One opinion invoked, but did not
extensively analyze, the state and federal constitutional jury provisions, and
held that the judge’s mother was “objectively biased” because she had “an
interest in the case, namely her familial relationship with the judge, that is
extraneous to the evidence on which the jury is to base its decision,” and which
she “would not have been able to set aside . . . when discharging her duties as a
juror.”85 The second opinion concluded that there was no constitutional
violation, but that reversal was necessary because the trial judge failed to
invoke his “broad inherent authority . . . to administer justice” by either
recusing himself or striking his mother from the jury.86
The Arkansas Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court reached the same result in similar cases, but with even more
truncated analyses.87 Both courts reversed verdicts reached by juries on which
the judges’ wives served.88 In support of their rulings, both courts invoked
arguments for the appearance of propriety and constitutional jury rights, but
neither elaborated on these reasons in any depth.89
D. The Constitutional Problem Created by a Juror with a Close Relationship
to the Presiding Judge
Despite the rather sparse constitutional analysis in the case law, there is, in
fact, a serious constitutional concern when a presiding judge and a juror share
a close relationship. It is true that judges and juries are both expected to act as
neutral and impartial entities; based on this expectation, there may be an
assumption that no constitutional problem arises when a relationship exists

82. See Elmore v. State, 144 S.W.3d 278, 279 (Ark. 2004); People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d
537, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (per curiam); State v. Tody, 764 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Wis. 2009).
83. See Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 280; Hartson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 539; Tody, 764 N.W.2d at
740.
84. Tody, 764 N.W.2d at 744. The author represented Mr. Tody on appeal as part of the
author’s work at the Frank J. Remington Center, a program at the University of Wisconsin Law
School. The Wisconsin State Public Defender appointed the Remington Center to handle the
appeal as part of one of its clinical programs, the Criminal Appeals Project.
85. Id. at 745 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 749 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
87. See Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 279–80; Hartson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 538–39.
88. Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 279–80; Hartson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 538–39.
89. Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 279–80; Hartson, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 538–39.
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between these two neutral entities. However, the focus on neutrality overlooks
the framers’ intent concerning the right to trial by jury.90
The framers were concerned not only with the jury’s neutrality to the parties
in a case, but also with the jury’s independence from the presiding judge.91
That concern stemmed from the English common law history of judicial
tyranny, when judges in the seventeenth century were essentially puppets of
the monarchy and served at the pleasure of the King.92 Although juries
existed, they were often aggressively influenced and intimidated by the
monarch’s hand-picked judges and faced possible punishment for disagreeing
with the monarch’s desired result.93
Eventually, English statutes and courts provided legal measures to insulate
jurors from judicial intimidation and influence.94 This shift is illustrated in the
famous Bushell’s Case of 1670, in which jurors were imprisoned for refusing
to follow the trial judge’s directions to convict the defendants of illegal
assembly.95 Bushell, one of the jurors, petitioned for writ of habeas corpus and
argued that the jury had a right to reach a verdict contrary to the judge’s
directions.96 The Court of Common Pleas sided with Bushell and held that
Bushell could not be punished for defying the trial judge’s orders regarding the
verdict because the jury had a right to act independently from the judge.97

90. See generally Thomas Regnier, Restoring the Founders’ Ideal of the Independent Jury
in Criminal Cases, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 775, 781, 819 (2011) (discussing the need for jurors
to be independent arbiters).
91. Id. at 781.
92. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, Of Judicature, in THE ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON 251,
257–58 (Mary Augusta Scott ed., 1908) (“Let judges also remember, that Salomon’s throne was
supported by lions on both sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne; being
circumspect that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.” (footnote omitted)).
93. See 4 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS
CAESAR TO THE ABDICATION OF JAMES THE SECOND, 1688 at 449–50 (1849) (“Timid juries, and
judges who held their offices during pleasure, never failed to second all the views of the crown.
And as the practice was anciently common of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing the
jurors, merely at the discretion of the court, for finding a verdict contrary to the direction of these
dependent judges, it is obvious that juries were then no manner of security to the liberty of the
subject.”).
94. Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber, 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10. (Eng.)
(“Whereas by the Great Charter many times confirmed in Parliament It is Enacted That no
Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his Freehold or Liberties or Free Customes
or be Outlawed or exiled or otherwise destroyed and that the King will not passé upon him or
condemn him but by lawfull judgement of his Peers or by the Law of the Land . . . .”).
95. Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (C.P.); see also John Marshall
Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil
Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 206–07 (1988) (discussing the background and significance of
Bushell’s Case).
96. See Mitnick, supra note 95, at 206.
97. Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012.
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Later, in 1701, the English government codified this idea by enacting a
statute providing for judicial independence from the King.98 American
colonial judges, however, continued to serve the King99 until the Declaration of
Independence provided for judicial independence.100
The framers separated the judge and the jury as two wholly independent
institutions based, in part, on this English common law history.101 Like the
court in Bushell’s Case, Alexander Hamilton believed that the jury should
serve as “a defence against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch,” and, as
such, must remain independent of judges too often subservient to the
monarch.102 Therefore, Hamilton emphasized that providing the right to a jury,
separate and independent from the judiciary, created a “double security”
against corruption:
[T]he trial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. It
greatly multiplies the impediments to its success. As matters now
stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury; for where
the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will generally grant a
new trial, and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon
the jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a
double security; and it will readily be perceived, that this
complicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions.
By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to
seduce the integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution which
the judges might have to surmount, must certainly be much fewer,

98. See Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in HISTORICAL
SOURCE BOOK 58–62 (Hutton Webster ed., 1920); Naamani Tarkow, The Significance of the Act
of Settlement in the Evolution of English Democracy, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 537, 555–56 (1943). This
history led Blackstone to describe the jury as a separate and independent check on a judiciary too
closely connected to the monarchy:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our
properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted to the
magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as
enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural
integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and
dignity. It is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should always be
attentive to the interests and good of the many.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at *379.
99. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 109
(1998).
100. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 11, 20 (U.S. 1776) (“He has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices . . . .”).
101. See Regnier, supra note 90, at 779–82 (describing the framers’ “willing[ness] to
improve [the legal system] in ways that would align with their new vision of government” and
their interest in renewing the idea of an indepdendent jury).
102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).

448

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:429

while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they might be, if
they had themselves the exclusive determination of all causes.103
The U.S. Supreme Court incorporated this understanding of juries into its
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.104 According to the Court:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the
Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history
and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges
too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted
upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused
with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.105
Justice Antonin Scalia, discussing whether an allegedly independent
judiciary provides sufficient protection for the individual against state
overreaching, wrote that “[j]udges, it is sometimes necessary to remind
ourselves, are part of the State.”106 The Court thus has incorporated the
framers’ intent that the judge and jury be considered two separate institutions,
and that juries must be able to exercise independent judgment shielded from
judicial influence.107
Thus, there is a significant constitutional problem with a juror having a close
personal relationship with the presiding judge, as it cannot be assumed that the
jury is truly separate and independent from a possibly biased judge in such
instances.108 Rather, when a juror has a close relationship to the judge, the
very problem the framers sought to avoid arises—that is, there is a greater
likelihood that the jury will defer to the judge and fail to act as an independent
decision maker.109 This is problematic, not because it contravenes the framers’
intent, but also because it weakens the basic procedural safeguards that shape
average people’s perceptions of the legal system.
Moreover, as discussed in the next section, these concerns are not merely
matters of perception. The risk of improper judicial influence on jurors is
more prevalent than one might think.110 Courts have long recognized that
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 458.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968).
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56.
See id. at 156.
See id. (discussing the founders’ intent to create an unbiased jury).
See infra Part III.E.
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jurors are likely to be influenced by even subtle and unintentional cues from
the judge.111 When a juror knows the judge well, it is even more likely that the
juror will pick up on and follow even unintentional cues.112
E. Why a Close Relationship Between Judge and Juror Can Imperil the
Fairness of a Trial: Judicial Cues to Jurors, and Jurors’ Propensity for
Following Those Cues
Most judges seek to uphold strict standards of propriety in their dealings
with jurors,113 and thus may believe that judges and jurors acting in good faith
will not allow their close personal relationship to taint the fairness of the
proceedings. Although this is certainly an admirable aspiration, it understates
the extent to which a judge can unconsciously influence jurors, and the extent
to which jurors will defer to even subtle judicial influence.
The Supreme Court has recognized that jurors naturally look to the judge for
guidance, and are easily swayed by the judge’s words and actions.114 The
Court has stated that a judge’s “lightest word or intimation is received [by the
jury] with deference, and may prove controlling.”115 Because of jurors’
profound sensitivity to the judge’s views about a case, courts around the
country have concluded that a judge’s comments or actions revealing favor to
one of the parties can require reversal of a judgment.116 As a result, trial
judges “must make every effort to avoid words or actions that the jury could
conceivably interpret as expressing any opinion on the evidence or any
partiality to one side.”117
In one case, for example, a Colorado appellate court reversed a criminal
conviction because the trial judge escorted the prosecution’s witness, a child,
to the witness stand.118 The court reversed the conviction because the jury
“could have perceived the trial court’s action as an endorsement of the child’s

111. See, e.g., Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894) (“It is obvious that under any
system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury is . . . of great weight . . . .” (citing
Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 452 (1893))).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 128–31.
113. See Jackson v. United States, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam)
(counseling restraint in jury trials to avoid prejudice).
114. Starr, 153 U.S. at 626.
115. Id. (citing Hicks, 150 U.S. at 452); see also State v. Carprue, 683 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Wis.
2004) (“The opinions of our appellate courts are replete with precatory admonitions that trial
judges must not function as partisans or advocates, or betray bias or prejudice, or engage in
excessive examination, particularly in front of juries.” (citing State v. Garner, 194 N.W.2d 649,
651 (Wis. 1972); Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Wis. 1970); State v.
Driscoll, 56 N.W.2d 788, 791 (Wis. 1953))).
116. See infra notes 118–123 and accompanying text.
117. Andrew Horwitz, Mixed Signals and Subtle Cues: Jury Independence and Judicial
Appointment of the Jury Foreperson, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 829, 851 (2005).
118. People v. Rogers, 800 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. App. 1990).
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credibility.”119 The court stated that trial judges “must be free of even the
appearance of bias and partiality.”120 Other courts have similarly reversed
decisions by trial judges who were seen giving candy or treats to child
witnesses after his or her testimony.121
The cases are not limited to trial judges’ conduct with child witnesses in
sexual-assault cases. A Florida appellate court reversed a conviction based on
an even slighter appearance of partiality—a handshake and brief conversation
between a trial judge and a state’s witness, which occurred in front of a jury.122
Similarly, a North Carolina appellate court reversed a criminal conviction
because the trial judge “turned his back to the jury for forty-five minutes
during the defendant’s testimony on direct examination.”123
In the same vein, numerous appellate courts and the American Bar
Association (ABA) have criticized the practice of judges questioning witnesses
in front of the jury or commenting on the evidence.124 ABA standards
particularly emphasize the independent role played by the jury and “the
uniquely influential position of the trial judge.”125
Fears of judicial influence on juries extend to nonverbal communication, and
even unintentional communication.126 The Alabama Supreme Court once
expressed “that facial expressions, gestures, and nonverbal communications
which tended to ridicule defendant and his counsel, could, standing alone,
operate so as to destroy the fairness of a trial.”127 Social-science research, in
legal and non-legal contexts, suggests that judges likely communicate their
119. Id. (citing People v. Martinez, 652 P.2d 174, 178 (Colo. App. 1981)).
120. Id. at 1328 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Hrapski, 718 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Colo.
1986)).
121. See Horwitz, supra note 117, at 851–52 (citing State v. Cook, 485 So. 2d 606, 609 (La.
Ct. App. 1986); State v. R.W., 491 A.2d 1304, 1309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)).
122. Abrams v. State, 326 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
123. State v. Jenkins, 445 S.E.2d 622, 624–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994). A Tennessee appellate
court reversed a criminal conviction under similar circumstances, in which the trial judge shook
his head during the defense attorney’s summation. Veal v. State, 268 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tenn.
1954).
124. See United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1095–96 (3rd Cir. 1983); United States v.
Bland, 697 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir.
1979); United States v. Hill, 332 F.2d 105, 106–07 (7th Cir. 1964); Billeci v. United States, 184
F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Jackson v. United States, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Benedict v. State, 208 N.W. 934, 936 (Wis. 1926); see also Horwitz, supra note 117, at 846
(noting that the ABA disfavors allowing judges to comment on evidence presented at trial);
Michael Pinard, Limitations on Judicial Activism in Criminal Trials, 33 CONN. L. REV. 243, 253
(2000).
125. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY & TRIAL BY JURY § 15-4.2 cmt. at 225
(3d ed. 1996).
126. See Peter David Blanck, Robert Rosenthal & La Doris Hazzard Cordell, The
Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38
STAN. L. REV. 89, 98 (1985). See generally Arthur F. Greenbaum, Note, Judges’ Nonverbal
Behavior in Jury Trials: A Threat to Judicial Impartiality, 61 VA. L. REV. 1266 (1975).
127. Allen v. State, 276 So. 2d 583, 586 (Ala. 1973).
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impressions and expectations to juries in subtle and unintentional ways,128 and
that the expectations influence juries’ decision making.129 Compounding this
danger, jurors naturally crave the judge’s guidance during the decision-making
process:
[J]urors, like most people, respond to unfamiliar surroundings by
looking for clues about how to behave and what to think. Because
the judge is the authority figure and the figure with the most prestige
in the courtroom, jurors tend to look to the judge for those clues.
Having sought and then received those clues from the trial judge,
jurors will do their best to follow them, seeking to avoid the feeling
that they have not done their jobs properly or the feeling that they
have somehow disappointed the judge; jurors, like most people, aim
to do a good job and to please those in a position of authority.130
Thus, there is little question that judicial influence—even if subtle and
unintentional—poses great risk to a juror’s neutral decision making, because
jurors search for indications of the judge’s views, the judge communicates his
or her views, and jurors perceive and follow the judge’s views.131
These dangers are more prevalent when a judge has a close relationship with
one of the jurors; in such a situation, the juror is much more likely to perceive
the judge’s views, either because the juror knows the judge’s predispositions
and thus can guess which way the judge is leaning, or because the juror is more
able to interpret the judge’s words, body language, and other subtle
communications. For instance, a particular juror in a medical-malpractice case
who knows that the judge had a similar traumatic experience might believe that
the judge is likely to sympathize with the patient. Similarly, a juror who has a
close relationship with the judge might recognize subtle facial expressions or

128. Horwitz, supra note 117, at 856 (noting that judgs “cannot help but form opinions” that
a jury could perceive).
129. See Blanck, Rosenthal & Cordell, supra note 126, at 108–09, 137–38.
130. Horwitz, supra note 117, at 859.
131. In many jurisdictions, the judge instructs the jury to disregard any impression the jury
has about the judge’s opinion in the case. See, e.g., WIS., JI-CRIMINAL § 100 (2004) (“If any
member of the jury has an impression of my opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty, disregard that impression entirely and decide the issues of fact solely as you view the
evidence. You, the jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and the court is the judge of the law
only.”). However, the assumption that such instructions are effective is arguably a legal
fiction: “The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury
. . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Addressing whether judicial
influence on jurors can be erased by curative instructions, another judge stated that “‘no matter
how much we may admonish them not to, jurors do pay a great deal of attention to the person
behind the bench.’” Horwitz, supra note 117, at 860 (quoting La Doris H. Cordell & Florence O.
Keller, Pay No Attention to the Woman Behind the Bench: Musings of a Trial Court Judge, 68
IND. L.J. 1199, 1207 (1993)). Rather than relying on curative instructions, “the key is to avoid
the potentially prejudicial conduct in the first place.” Id. at 861.
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changes in tone of voice as revealing exasperation with a party’s attorneys or
witnesses.
Once these subtle cues have been sent by the judge, even if unintentionally,
and understood by a juror who knows the judge well, that juror is much more
likely to trust and follow the cues and decide the case in accordance with
them.132 Or, such a juror may fear the repercussions of reaching a decision that
contradicts the judge’s views, and feel intimidated by contradicting the
judge.133
Furthermore, there is an additional risk that, outside the courtroom, a juror
with a close relationship to the judge will be much more likely to have ex parte
conversations about the case, despite prohibitions against this, as mention of
the case would be difficult to avoid in social settings. And, as previously
discussed, it would be easy for the juror to pick up even unintentionally
communicated views from the judge that reveal his or her views about the
case, even in brief and casual exchanges.
Finally, in the jury room during deliberations, there is a risk that a juror
closely connected to the judge will carry more weight with other jurors.134 As
explained above, most jurors are in an unfamiliar setting and are looking for an
authority figure with greater knowledge or experience with the legal system.
Other jurors may perceive a juror closely connected to the judge as such an
authority figure. If other jurors defer to that juror, then the parties have been
deprived of a jury consisting of independent community members.135
Thus, there are strong constitutional and practical arguments for excluding a
potential juror who has a close personal relationship to the presiding judge.
However, there is a more fundamental systemic argument that harkens back to
Caperton—protecting public confidence in the absolute probity and neutrality
of the court system.136 At a basic level, it does not appear appropriate for the
presiding judge to empanel a juror with whom he or she has a close personal
relationship.137 A judge who fails to exclude such a juror will likely create the
perception that the judge is not concerned with maintaining absolute probity
and neutrality.138 By contrast, a judge who excludes someone with whom he
or she has a close personal relationship will build confidence in case
132. Horowitz, supra note 117, at 850 (discussing a judge’s effect on jury instructions).
Admittedly, the opposite will be true in some cases. A juror who knows the judge and does not
trust the judge’s opinion might be inclined to go against the judge.
133. Id. at 859 (discussing even the average juror’s desire to please the judge).
134. See State v. Tody, 764 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Wis. 2009).
135. Id. at 740.
136. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009).
137. See Tody, 764 N.W.2d at 739–40 (“The immediate reaction of the members of the court
upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the circuit court judge’s mother on the
jury raises red flags of danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule on matters
involving a member of his or her family.”).
138. Cf. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (noting the apparent prudence of avoiding any possible
partiality sua sponte).
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participants and observers, who will think that the judge is performing his or
her duties with total neutrality and probity.
F. What Specific Rules and Procedures Should Govern Close Relationships
Between the Presiding Judge and a Potential Juror?
Once one accepts that problems arise from a close relationship between the
presiding judge and a potential juror, a number of questions arise about how
best to respond. If it is impermissible for a jury to include someone who has a
close relationship to the presiding judge, should the remedy be exclusion of the
juror or recusal of the judge? What type and degree of relationship between a
potential juror and the judge should disqualify the juror? If the rule primarily
focuses on familial relationships, what degree of kinship triggers
disqualification? What about nonfamilial, but close, personal relationships,
such as friendships or business relationships? Should exclusion be a
categorical rule or a balancing test—or both, based on the type of relationship?
If there is a balancing test for some relationships, who should conduct it?
1. Exclusion of a Juror or Recusal of the Judge
Exclusion of jurors is preferable to recusal for mainly logistical reasons. In
small counties, judicial recusal can be very burdensome, in that it often
requires a judge from an outside county to travel to a neighboring county and
hear the case.139 Not only is this inconvenient for the out-of-county judge, but
it can also potentially delay the proceeding at issue, which is inconvenient to
jurors and litigants. In larger communities, more judges may be available, but
delays and inconveniences are nonetheless inherent in replacing a judge.140
Although such logistical burdens may be justified when no other alternative
exists, here there is a much simpler alternative: removing the juror. This is not
a completely cost-free solution—citizens have an important interest in
participating in jury duty,141 and, therefore, a rule excluding certain people
closely connected to a judge in a single-judge county from participating as
jurors will prevent them from ever serving on a jury. But, compared to
requiring judicial recusal, exclusion of jurors is preferable.
2. Defining Rules and Procedures for the Exclusion of Jurors
The next step is defining which relationships are, in fact, problematic. As a
starting point, it makes sense to define familial relationships categorically in
terms of degrees of kinship. Thus, one could imagine excluding relatives at
139. See Lauren Treadwell, Note, Informal Closing of the Bypass: Minors’ Petitions to
Bypass Parental Consent for Abortion in an Age of Increasing Judicial Recusals, 58 HASTINGS
L.J. 869, 880 (2007).
140. Cf. id. (noting that reassignments may be burdensome).
141. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (noting that apart from the ability to vote,
“for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to
participate in the democratic process”).
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either the first degree (parents, children, siblings), the second degree
(grandparents and grandchildren), or the third degree (uncles, aunts, nieces,
and nephews).142
Regardless of where the line is drawn, such a categorical rule will be
imperfect in some cases; even some typically close familial relationships (such
as siblings) will be strained in certain families, and thus will not raise problems
of independence from the judge. Similarly, some typically distant familial
relationships (such as second or third cousins) will be very close in some
families, and thus may raise problems of independence from the judge.
Nonetheless, it seems sensible to assume that kinships in the first, second, and
third degrees are sufficiently close in most families to raise concerns about
independence from the judge.143 Therefore, jurors who fall within these
degrees of kinship should be categorically excluded. Legislatures seeking to
craft such a rule need not write on a blank slate: family and intestacy statutes
often contain legislative definitions based on degrees of kinship,144 which may
be referenced or incorporated into juror statutes.145
Certain nonfamilial relationships, such as friendships, business relationships,
fiduciary relationships, and employer/employee relationships, will often also
be sufficiently close to raise serious concerns about juror independence from
the judge. For these nonfamilial relationships, a categorical approach is
ineffective because inherent subjectivity is required to determine what
constitutes a “close” relationship.146
For such nonfamilial relationships, judges and jurors should be required to
fully disclose the relationship, and the parties should have the right to full voir
dire. After voir dire, if a party moves to strike the juror, the judge should
conduct a balancing test to determine whether the juror raises concerns about
judicial independence. In balancing, judges should consider factors such as the
nature and length of the relationship between the judge and potential juror, the
time and nature of the most recent contact, whether the judge and the juror are
142. See 23 AM.JUR. 2D Descent & Distribution §§ 72–73 (2002).
143. Cf. OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(a)(2) (2011).
144. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 990.001(16) (West 2007).
145. Apart from the question of which jurors should fall within the categorical rule, the
additional question arises of whether the judge should strike such jurors sua sponte, or whether
the parties should be required to make a motion to strike. The author is currently litigating this
issue in the Wisconsin Supreme Court. State v. Sellhausen, 794 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Wis. Ct. App.
2010), review granted, 794 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2011). In that case, we argued in the court of
appeals that a sua sponte strike is preferable, because it avoids the need for one of the lawyers to
potentially antagonize the judge by moving to strike the judge’s family member. A lawyer in that
position might understandably fear that the judge, consciously or unconsciously, might take
offense to the insinuation that the judge’s family member is not an appropriate juror. Such a
scenario could lead to problems later in the trial, either because the lawyer advocates less
zealously for fear of further antagonizing the judge, or because the judge’s leftover hostility
toward the lawyer could affect later rulings at trial.
146. John C. McKeon & David G. Rice, Administering Justice in Montana’s Rural Courts,
70 MONT. L. REV. 201, 215 (2009) (discussing one test used by judges for recusal purposes).
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likely to see each other in an out-of-court setting during the case proceeding,
and whether the judge or the juror believes the relationship could influence the
juror’s decision making.
Admittedly, requiring the judge to assess his own relationship to a juror
presents risks.147 Some judges would likely be unable to put aside their own
subjective view regarding their (and their close associates’) ability to rise
above any possible prejudice.148 Other judges might be overly cautious and
strike anyone with any conceivable connection to the judge, therefore
excluding jurors who, in fact, pose no threat to the jury’s independence from
the judge.149
Although not entirely ideal, judicial balancing is probably the best solution
compared to the alternative solutions. As indicated above, it is not sensible to
categorically prohibit any person with any conceivable connection to the judge,
and it is logistically unworkable to suggest that someone other than the judge
should conduct the requisite balancing test.150 At some point, the system must
accept that, in these instances, a judge’s determination, even though involving
someone with whom she has a prior relationship, is logistically necessary.
There is, admittedly, a potential harm to public confidence if the judge
concludes that the juror should not be excluded based on the balancing test.
However, this harm is minimized by using a transparent voir dire procedure
and by requiring a full explanation in open court of the basis for the judge’s
decision. If such procedures are followed, survey research suggests that public
participants and observers will have more confidence in the judge’s ultimate
decision not to remove the juror.151

147. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (acknowledging
that the judge who subjectively examined whether he was biased toward his campaign contributor
concluded that he was not, and finding this insufficient because of the likelihood that judges are
not capable of objectively discerning their own motivations). The Court wrote:
Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance
of judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in
the ordinary course of deciding a case. This does not mean the inquiry is a
simple one. . . .
There are instances when the introspection that often attends this process may reveal
that what the judge had assumed to be a proper, controlling factor is not the real one at
work. If the judge discovers that some personal bias or improper consideration seems to
be the actuating cause of the decision or to be an influence so difficult to dispel that
there is a real possibility of undermining neutrality, the judge may think it necessary to
consider withdrawing from the case.
Id.
148. See id.
149. Cf. Hayes v. Forman, 568 P.2d 579, 580 (Nev. 1977) (reinstating a judge who had been
forced to recuse on the basis of his religion, which was alleged to favor one party).
150. See McKeon & Rice, supra note 146, at 214 (discussing limitations of resources and
demands on courts).
151. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Public confidence in the courts is an important, yet elusive, ideal. Although
Caperton and other judicial opinions have relied on rhetoric about fostering
such confidence, few courts or commentators have closely examined what
target audience is meant by “public” or how to foster this group’s confidence
through judicial opinions. Courts have limited ability to communicate with the
general public through judicial opinions, because most people do not read or
know about specific opinions. Further, highly salient opinions that do reach
the public often deal with controversial social issues upon which the public is
divided, and thus the decisions on such issues may be unlikely to build
broad-based public confidence.
Nonetheless, courts have an opportunity to improve public confidence in the
legal system through members of the public who directly participate in and
observe the court system in various settings. As people’s perceptions of courts
depend heavily on observance of basic procedural fairness, courts hoping to
improve public confidence in the legal system should focus on following
procedural rules that will resonate with people directly participating in or
observing court proceedings.
From this perspective, Caperton will likely positively affect public
confidence in courts because it implements a fundamental rule of procedural
fairness—preventing a judge from presiding over a case in which a party was a
significant campaign contributor.152 Similarly, courts can positively influence
public confidence during jury selection, which is a common instance of
interaction between people outside of the legal profession and the court
system. Potential jurors who have a close relationship to the presiding judge
should be excluded due to significant constitutional concerns that are rooted in
the right to trial by jury, and concerns about preserving the public’s confidence
in the judiciary’s neutrality and probity. Courts addressing this situation should
exclude such jurors based on procedural-fairness rules to preserve the
confidence of people participating in and observing legal proceedings.

152. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263–64.

